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PLAYING COOPERATIVELY WITH POSSIBLY TREACHEROUS
PARTNER
K. LES´NIAK
Abstract. We investigate an alternative concept of Nash equilibrium, m-equilibrium,
which slightly resembles Harsanyi-Selten risk dominant equilibrium although it is a dif-
ferent notion. M-equilibria provide nontrivial solutions of normal form games as shown
by comparison of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with the Traveler’s Dilemma. They are also
resistant on the deep iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
1. Introduction
The games of interest here are two person general sum games in normal form. Concern-
ing notation and definitions the reader is asked to consult the next Section.
First one has to provide additional information about the game. The main assumption,
usually made implicitly, is that the players can communicate with each other. This remedies
the coordination problem quoted below (see [HaMa] for complexity issues).
Example 1.[Coordination] Let S1 = S2 = {1, 2, 3},
G =
 [2, 2] [0, 0] [0, 0][0, 0] [1, 1] [0, 0]
[0, 0] [0, 0] [2, 2]
 .
Among three equilibria (1, 1), (2, 2) and (3, 3) only two are pleasant (as Pareto dominant),
namely (1, 1) and (3, 3). If players cannot communicate, then they have to use randomiza-
tion (e.g., coin flipping). The Bernoulli scheme would let them synchronize choices with
small probability of failure (cf. Theorem 11.3 in [AlGa, chap.11.4]). ♦
Thus we see that some amount of communication (say pre-play/cheap talk) and a sort
of cooperation cannot be dismissed even in the case of such competitive/“selfish” notion
like the Nash equilibrium (e.g., [Au2, MiMo, Ro]). The classic stag hunt game exploits
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another issue of miscoordination – the Wald criterion of worst possible scenario. In the
vein of a stag hunt’s strategic security consider
Example 2. Let S1 = S2 = {1, 2},
G =
[
[4, 4] [1, 4]
[4, 1] [3, 3]
]
.
The pairs (1, 1) and (2, 2) are Nash equilibria with (1, 1) being Pareto dominant. Neverthe-
less one cannot guarantee that previously agreed among players equilibrium (1, 1) would
be realized in practice. If the player is confident in fair play of his partner, he might switch
strategy without any loss of income. The pair of strategies (2, 2) is threat-safe although
yields smaller payoffs than (1, 1). ♦
Players make their final decisions independently of others. Therefore communication
provides only weak cooperation ([HiKo]). No one can force fair play, even if it is profitable
for all (free rider’s problem).
Largely discussed traveler’s dilemma (seen sometimes as the extension of prisoner’s
dilemma) underlines anomalous behavior in widely accepted procedure called an itera-
tive elimination of dominated strategies ([Ba, BaBeSt, CbCpGo, Gi, HlPs]). Unlike the
original formulation our assumes communication between players.
Example 3.[Traveler’s dilemma] Let S1 = S2 = {2, 3, . . . , 100}, P1(x, y) = P2(y, x) =
min(x, y) + 2 · sign(y − x) for x ∈ S1, y ∈ S2, G = (S1, S2;P1, P2). Then (2, 2) is the only
Nash equilibrium of G. It arises through the elimination of dominated strategies, although
most strategy pairs Pareto dominate it.
Observe that the players could choose a pair of strategies which yields much higher pay-
offs than (2, 2). Moreover, the player can still play very profitably after his partner betrayed
and switched strategy to get higher payoffs. If more than 4% partners play “moderately”
(at least 54), then we can expect higher gain from playing “dummy” 100 than from playing
“wise” 2. If more than 10% partners play “high” (at least 90), then playing 100 we can
expect over 400% income of that which we could earn playing 2. ♦
Our point here is that one should calculate secure gains incorporating possible threats
from his partner. This allows sometimes for much higher payoffs than those arising in the
Nash equilibrium. That was the main motivation for introducing m-equilibria as we do in
Section 4.
We silently assume that the games under consideration are not repeated and one-shot ;
see also the discussion around mixed equilibria in Examples 6 and 7. We understand the
payoff to be NTU (nontransferable utility); that some “transfers” are still possible ensures
us Example 9 in Section 5 and informal discussion of fair choice among equilibria in Section
8.
For standard notions and theorems of game theory we refer to the textbook [Wa] (comp.
[Da, Au]). Throughout the paper the language of multivalued (or set-valued) analysis shall
be utilized in several places (consult [HuPa, Be, Au]).
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2. Notation and definitions
Let Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R) be a two person game (in normal form). Σi is
the set of strategies and Pi is the payoff function of the i-th player.
An accent will be put further on the case of a finite game G = (S1, S2;W1,W2 : S1×S2 →
R), i.e., the game with the finite strategy sets S1, S2, and its mixed extension ∆(G) =
(∆(S1),∆(S2);EW1, EW2 : ∆(S1)×∆(S2)→ R). ∆(S) stands for the standard simplex of
probabilistic measures (mixed strategies) spanned on the finite set S of (pure) strategies;
S ⊂ ∆(S) due to the identification via Dirac measures: S ∋ x 7→ δx ∈ ∆(S). The expected
payoffs are given by
EWi(ρ1, ρ2) =
∑
(x,y)∈S1×S2
ρ1(x) ·Wi(x, y) · ρ2(y)
for ρi ∈ ∆(Si), i = 1, 2. Finite games shall appear in the examples as bimatrices[
[W1(x, y),W2(x, y)](x,y)∈S1×S2
]
, S1 ∋ x – the number of the row, S2 ∋ y – the num-
ber of the column.
It is customary to employ the convention ((σi, σ−i)) = (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2, Σ−i = Σ3−i
and P−i = P3−i which emphasizes the role of the i-th player (i = 1, 2); the same applies to
((x, y)) ∈ S1 × S2, ((pi, y)) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2), W−i etc.
For technical reasons we shall tacitly assume payoff functions Pi to be bounded from
below in the co-player’s variable, i.e., infσ−i∈Σ−i Pi((σi, σ−i)) > −∞ for σi ∈ Σi, i = 1, 2.
The continuity of Pi is not assumed and, in the case of finite strategy sets Si, of no use.
The game Γ is said to be strictly competitive, if
∀(σ1,σ2),(σ′1,σ′2)∈Σ1×Σ2 P1(σ′1, σ′2) > P1(σ1, σ2)⇔P2(σ′1, σ′2) < P2(σ1, σ2).
Let us note that strictly competitive games are essentially zero-sum games (see [AdDaPa]).
We call Γ quantitatively symmetric, if P1(σ1, σ2) = P2(σ2, σ1) for σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ1 = Σ2.
Proposition 1. If G is a finite strictly competitive game, resp. quantitatively symmetric
game, then its mixed extension ∆(G) is of the same character.
Definition 1. A pair of strategies (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 is
• Pareto optimum, PO(Γ), if
¬∃(σ1,σ2)∈Σ1×Σ2∀i=1,2 Pi(σ1, σ2) > Pi(σ∗1, σ∗2),
• strong Pareto optimum, SPO(Γ), if
¬∃(σ1,σ2)∈Σ1×Σ2 [ ∀i=1,2 Pi(σ1, σ2) ≥ Pi(σ∗1, σ∗2) ∧ ∃i=1,2 Pi(σ1, σ2) > Pi(σ∗1, σ∗2) ] ,
• Wald solution, W (Γ), if
∀i=1,2 σ∗i ∈ arg max
σi∈Σi
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ−i)),
• Nash equilibrium, NE(Γ), if
∀σ1∈Σ1, σ2∈Σ2∀i=1,2 Pi((σi, σ∗−i)) ≤ Pi((σ∗i , σ∗−i)),
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• strict Nash equilibrium, SNE(Γ), if
∀σ1∈Σ1\{σ∗1}, σ2∈Σ2\{σ∗2}∀i=1,2 Pi((σi, σ∗−i)) < Pi((σ∗i , σ∗−i)),
• semi-strict Nash equilibrium, SSNE(Γ), if it is Nash equilibrium and
∀σ1∈Σ1, σ2∈Σ2∀i=1,2
[
Pi((σi, σ
∗
−i)) = Pi((σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i))⇒P−i((σi, σ∗−i)) = P−i((σ∗i , σ∗−i))
]
,
• weakly semi-strict Nash equilibrium, WSSNE(Γ), if it is Nash equilibrium and
∀σ1∈Σ1, σ2∈Σ2∀i=1,2
[
Pi((σi, σ
∗
−i)) = Pi((σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i))⇒P−i((σi, σ∗−i)) ≥ P−i((σ∗i , σ∗−i))
]
,
• coupled in wealth improvement, CWI(Γ), if
∀σ1∈Σ1, σ2∈Σ2∀i=1,2
[
Pi((σi, σ
∗
−i)) ≥ Pi((σ∗i , σ∗−i))⇒P−i((σi, σ∗−i)) ≥ P−i((σ∗i , σ∗−i))
]
.
Remark that WSSNE(Γ) = NE(Γ) ∩ CWI(Γ). The last three concepts (SSNE,
WSSNE, and CWI) are provided by ourselves and their role shall be clear in view of
further investigations. Loosely speaking (weakly) semi-strict equilibria retain most impor-
tant features of strict equilibria, especially those associated with strategic uncertainty as
shown in Example 2. Remark also that the (weakly) semi-strict equilibrium is a concept
different from the weakly strict equilibrium introduced in [BoCaGJMN] and quasi strict
equilibrium in [No]. Finally the reader should be warned that the Wald solution becomes
the maximin solution if additionally the “minimax identity” holds
∀i=1,2 Pi(σ∗1, σ∗2) = max
σi∈Σi
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ−i)).
We have the following relations
SNE(Γ)  SSNE(Γ)  WSSNE(Γ)  NE(Γ).
The inclusions are immediate from the definitions. That they are strict illustrates:
Example 4.[3-4-5 game] Let S1 = S2 = {1, 2, 3, 4},
G =

[3, 3] [0, 0] [0, 0] [0, 0]
[0, 0] [4, 4] [0, 0] [4, 4]
[0, 0] [0, 0] [3, 3] [5, 3]
[0, 0] [4, 4] [3, 5] [5, 5]
 .
Then (4, 4) ∈ NE(G)\WSSNE(G), (3, 3) ∈ WSSNE(G)\SSNE(G), (2, 2) ∈ SSNE(G)\
SNE(G), (1, 1) ∈ SNE(G). ♦
Proposition 2. The equilibria of a finite game G and its mixed extension ∆(G) are related
as follows:
(1) NE(G) ⊂ NE(∆(G)),
(2) SNE(G) ⊂ SNE(∆(G)),
(3) SSNE(G) ⊂ SSNE(∆(G)),
(4) WSSNE(G) ⊂WSSNE(∆(G)).
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Proof. We only check the last invariance, the rest can be performed analogously. Let
((x∗, y∗)) ∈ WSSNE(G) and suppose that some deviation from x∗ ∈ Si to a mixed strategy
pi ∈ ∆(Si) still gives equally good gain for the i-th player i.e. EWi((x∗, y∗)) = EWi((pi, y∗)).
First note that since ((x∗, y∗)) is a Nash equilibrium of G, then Wi((x, y∗)) ≤Wi((x∗, y∗))
for all x ∈ supp pi. Now if Wi((x, y∗)) < Wi((x∗, y∗)) for some x ∈ supp pi, then
EWi((pi, y
∗)) = pi(x) ·Wi((x, y∗)) +
∑
x 6=x∈suppπ
pi(x) ·Wi((x, y∗))
<
(
pi(x) +
∑
x 6=x∈suppπ
pi(x)
)
·Wi((x∗, y∗)) = EWi((x∗, y∗)).
Therefore in fact we have Wi((x, y
∗)) = Wi((x∗, y∗)) for x ∈ supp pi. Recalling that
((x∗, y∗)) ∈ WSSNE(G) we obtain that W−i((x, y∗)) ≥ W−i((x∗, y∗)) for x ∈ supp pi.
Finally
EW−i((pi, y∗)) =
∑
x∈suppπ
pi(x) ·W−i((x, y∗))
≥
(∑
x
pi(x)
)
·W−i((x∗, y∗)) = EW−i((x∗, y∗)).
⊠
Theorem 1. In the strictly competitive game Γ all equilibria are semi-strict, NE(Γ) =
SSNE(Γ).
Proof. Let (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) ∈ NE(Γ). Competitiveness implies that equal payoffs of one player
correspond to equal payoffs of the other one. Therefore
Pi((σi, σ
∗
−i)) = Pi((σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i))⇒P−i((σi, σ∗−i)) = P−i((σ∗i , σ∗−i)), i = 1, 2,
so (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ∈ SSNE(Γ). ⊠
Recall that the Nash equilibria of the strictly competitive game are precisely maximin
solutions.
3. Lower payoff
In any game Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R) predicted possible behavior of players
may be described via the response map Ri : Σ1 × Σ2 → 2Σi , i = 1, 2. The best response
map BRi : Σ1 × Σ2 → 2Σi defined by
BRi((σi, σ−i)) =
{
σ˜i ∈ Σi : Pi((σ˜i, σ−i)) = max
σ′
i
∈Σi
Pi((σ
′
i, σ−i))
}
for i = 1, 2, ((σi, σ−i)) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2, is a usual choice, provided that the payoffs are (upper
semi-) continuous and the strategy spaces are compact. We would like to investigate other
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option: not worse response. The not worse response map NWRi : Σ1×Σ2 → 2Σi is defined
by
NWRi((σi, σ−i)) = { σ˜i ∈ Σi : Pi((σ˜i, σ−i)) ≥ Pi((σi, σ−i)) }
for i = 1, 2, ((σi, σ−i)) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2.
Indeed any player who wants to maximize his payoff would not change his strategy into
a new one, if it leads to lower payoff. Therefore any response map Ri should obey the
following restrictions
BRi((σi, σ−i)) ⊂ Ri((σi, σ−i)) ⊂ NWRi((σi, σ−i)).
Nevertheless one is not forced to play the best response. We should only incorporate in our
calculations the possible answers of the co-player to estimate sure gain. This is reflected
by the lower payoff function P ♭i : Σ1 × Σ2 → R,
P ♭i ((σi, σ−i)) = inf Pi(( σi, R3−i((σ−i, σi)) )).
In the case of our choice Ri = NWRi:
P ♭i ((σi, σ−i)) = inf {Pi((σi, σ˜−i)) : P−i((σ˜−i, σi)) ≥ P−i((σ−i, σi)) }.
Let us note a simple but useful property
Lemma 1. There holds estimation P ♭i ≤ Pi, i = 1, 2. Moreover, P ♭i (σ1, σ2) = Pi(σ1, σ2)
for i = 1, 2 if and only if (σ1, σ2) ∈ CWI(Γ).
Theorem 2. Let Σ1,Σ2 be compact spaces. If P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R are continuous, then
P ♭1 , P
♭
2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R are lower semicontinuous.
Proof. By continuity of Pi the map NWRi : Σ1×Σ2 → 2Σi has closed graph for i = 1, 2.
Compactness of the domain Σ1 × Σ2 implies that the map
Σ1 × Σ2 ∋ ((σi, σ−i)) 7→ (( σi, NWR3−i((σ−i, σi)) )) ⊂ Σ1 × Σ2
is upper semicontinuous with compact values. Composing it with continuous Pi and Haus-
dorff nonexpansive min : 2R → R yields lower semicontinuity of P ♭i . ⊠
Proposition 3. If Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R) is the strictly competitive game,
then for σi ∈ Σi, σ−i ∈ Σ−i
P ♭i ((σi, σ−i)) = inf
σ′
−i
∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ
′
−i)).
Proof. Let i = 1, 2, σi, σ
′
i ∈ Σi, σ−i, σ′−i ∈ Σ−i. Observe that
P−i(σ′1, σ
′
2) ≥ P−i(σ1, σ2)⇔Pi(σ′1, σ′2) ≤ Pi(σ1, σ2).
Hence
P ♭i ((σi, σ−i)) = inf
{
Pi((σi, σ−i)) : P−i((σi, σ′−i)) ≥ P−i((σi, σ−i))
}
=
inf
{
Pi((σi, σ−i)) : Pi((σi, σ′−i)) ≤ Pi((σi, σ−i))
}
= inf
σ′
−i
∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ
′
−i)).
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⊠
Roughly speaking in the competitive game the lower payoff of the player depends only
upon his own strategy.
4. M-equilibrium
We associate with Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1×Σ2 → R) the flat-game Γ♭ = (Σ1,Σ2;P ♭1 , P ♭2 :
Σ1 × Σ2 → R).
Definition 2. An m-equilibrium of the game Γ is the Nash equilibrium of Γ♭, ME(Γ) =
NE(Γ♭).
The Nash and m-equilibria are not related in a straightforward way.
Example 5. Let S1 = S2 = {1, 2, 3},
G =
 [1, 4] [0, 0] [4, 4][0, 0] [3, 3] [5, 3]
[4, 4] [3, 5] [5, 3]
 .
Then (2, 2) ∈ ME(G) ∩WSSNE(G), (2, 3) ∈ ME(G) ∩ NE(G) \WSSNE(G), (3, 1) ∈
ME(G) \NE(G), (3, 3) ∈ NE(G) \ME(G) with strongly Pareto optimal last pair. ♦
Any decision rule which uses lower payoff estimations (stick to an m-equilibrium in our
case) is resistant on iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Formally
Proposition 4. Let the i-th player, i ∈ {1, 2}, expect at least vi = P ♭i ((σi, σ−i)) from
playing ((σi, σ−i)) in Γ. Suppose that the partner of i changes his strategy σ−i into σ′−i
according to possibly higher payoff P−i((σ′−i, σi)) ≥ P−i((σ−i, σi)). Then the i-th player is
still satisfied, because Pi((σi, σ
′
−i)) ≥ vi.
This obvious assertion (restatement of the definition of the lower payoff) explains why
the player does not need to reject his dominated strategies.
To understand possible quirks of being content with warranted lower payoff one should
consider two classic zero-sum games.
Example 6.[Hide a coin] Let S1 = S2 = {1, 2},
G =
[
[−10, 10] [15,−15]
[15,−15] [−20, 20]
]
.
Then NE(G) = ∅, although ME(G) = NE(G♭) = {1} × S2,
G♭ =
[
[−10,−15] [−10,−15]
[−20,−15] [−20,−15]
]
.
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The first player cannot ensure payoff higher than −10, the second player cannot ensure
payoff higher than −15. ♦
Example 7.[Matching pennies] Let S1 = S2 = {1, 2},
G =
[
[1,−1] [−1, 1]
[−1, 1] [1,−1]
]
.
Then NE(G) = ∅, although ME(G) = NE(G♭) = S1 × S2,
G♭ =
[
[−1,−1] [−1,−1]
[−1,−1] [−1,−1]
]
.
None of the players can ensure payoff higher than −1.
On the other hand NE(∆(G)) = {(1
2
δ1 +
1
2
δ2,
1
2
δ1 +
1
2
δ2
)} and this constitutes the main
argument for mixed strategies if we view strategic interaction as did von Neumann: trying
to outmanoeuvre other participants. ♦
The key to resolve inconsistency of m-equilibrium with the hiding player’s choice pol-
icy behind a mixed strategy is to recognize that the m-equilibrium concentrates on the
question what can be warranted in one-shot game rather than what can be gambled during
repeated play. This seems paradoxical, but one also needs to take into account injurious
though rational player as during analysis in Example 2 (comp. comment from p.9 before
Theorem 3).
We investigate further properties of flat-games and m-equilibria.
Proposition 5. Lower value of a game does not change when substitute payoffs with lower
payoffs:
sup
σi∈Σi
inf
σ−i∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ−i)) = sup
σi∈Σi
inf
σ−i∈Σ−i
P ♭i ((σi, σ−i)).
Proof. Fix σi ∈ Σi, σ−i ∈ Σ−i, i = 1, 2. By the definition of the lower payoff and
Lemma 1:
inf
σ−i∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ−i)) ≤ P ♭i ((σi, σ−i)) ≤ Pi((σi, σ−i)).
Thus
(1) inf
σ−i∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ−i)) = inf
σ−i∈Σ−i
P ♭i ((σi, σ−i)).
⊠
M-equilibrium is a strategic concept – it depends upon mutual preferences of players.
Proposition 6. Let Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R) be a game and ϕi : R → R be
strictly increasing right continuous functions, i = 1, 2. Then the game Γ˜ = (Σ1,Σ2; P˜1, P˜2 :
Σ1×Σ2 → R) transformed from Γ via the formula P˜i = ϕi◦Pi admits the same m-equilibria
as the original game Γ; symbolically ME(Γ˜) =ME(Γ).
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Proof. Observe that ϕi(inf Z) = inf ϕi(Z) for Z ⊂ R, i = 1, 2. Then a direct calculation
shows that P˜i
♭
= ϕi ◦ P ♭i whence the conclusion follows. ⊠
We postpone a more technically subtle discussion of the above property to the Appendix.
Weakly semi-strict Nash equilibria are those equilibria which survive “flattenization”
of the game. Due to a one-sided exploitation of player’s trust the other player might
change his strategy without loss of his payoff just to lower the payoff of his partner, which
explains why not all Nash equilibria are m-equilibria (cf. Example 2). Despite possible
complications illustrated by Example 5 a positive criterion for a Nash equilibrium to be
an m-equilibrium provides
Theorem 3. The equilibria of the game Γ and its flat Γ♭ are related as follows:
(1) WSSNE(Γ) ⊂WSSNE(Γ♭),
(2) SSNE(Γ) ⊂ SSNE(Γ♭),
(3) SNE(Γ) ⊂ SNE(Γ♭).
Proof. We only check the first inclusion, the rest being analogous.
Let (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) ∈ WSSNE(Γ), i = 1, 2. By Lemma 1 for σi,
(2) P ♭i ((σi, σ
∗
−i)) ≤ Pi((σi, σ∗−i)) ≤ Pi((σ∗i , σ∗−i)) = P ♭i ((σ∗i , σ∗−i)),
which shows (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) ∈ NE(Γ♭).
Suppose that P ♭i ((σi, σ
∗
−i)) = P
♭
i ((σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i)). Then from (2) Pi((σi, σ
∗
−i)) = Pi((σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i)).
Observe that
P ♭−i((σi, σ
∗
−i)) = inf
{
P−i((σ˜i, σ∗−i)) : Pi((σ˜i, σ
∗
−i)) ≥ Pi((σi, σ∗−i)) = Pi((σ∗i , σ∗−i))
}
= inf
{
P−i((σ˜i, σ∗−i)) : Pi((σ˜i, σ
∗
−i)) = Pi((σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i))
}
,
since (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) stays in equilibrium. Now any σ˜i with Pi((σ˜i, σ
∗
−i)) = Pi((σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i)) gives
P−i((σ˜i, σ∗−i)) ≥ P−i((σ∗i , σ∗−i)), because (σ∗1 , σ∗2) is weakly semi-strict equilibrium. Hence
P ♭−i((σi, σ
∗
−i)) ≥ P−i((σ∗i , σ∗−i)) = P ♭−i((σ∗i , σ∗−i)),
where the last equality assures Lemma 1. ⊠
Proposition 7. If Γ is quantitatively symmetric, then Γ♭ too.
Neither zero-sum, nor strict competitiveness of the game is preserved under “flatteniza-
tion” procedure as show Examples 6 and 7.
5. Motivating examples
We bring to the readers attention three classic games where the m-equilibrium turns out
to be a nontrivial concept.
Example 8.[Traveler’s dilemma – continuation] Let G be as in Example 3. We have
NE(G) = SNE(G) = {(2, 2)} and P ♭1(x, y) = P ♭2(y, x) = min(x, y)−4+2 ·sign(x−y) for
x, y ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 100}. HenceG♭ admits two equilibria, so thatME(G) = {(2, 2), (100, 100)}.
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The outcome (100, 100) was often proposed by people (cf. [Sciam]) as a reasonable Pareto
optimal solution regardless of a possible treacherous behavior of the co-player. (Interest-
ingly, G♭♭ possesses three equilibria, which shows that NE(G♭♭) 6= NE(G♭) in general). ♦
Example 9.[Cournot duopoly; [BiChKoSz, Wa]] Let Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R),
S1 = S2 = [0, L], L > 0, P1(x, y) = P2(y, x) = x · (L− (x+ y)) for x, y ∈ [0, L] . Then
NE(Γ) = SNE(Γ) =
(
L
3
, L
3
)
.
Using elementary methods (cf. [Wa]) we find that P ♭1(x, y) = x ·min(y, L− (x+y)) and
ME(Γ) = {(x, L− 2x) : 0 ≤ x ≤ L/3} ∪
{(
x,
L− x
2
)
: L/3 ≤ x ≤ L
}
.
Note that from the cartel point of view, a Pareto dominating TU-solution (L/4, L/4)
would be superior. Unfortunately this “natural” solution is not an m-equilibrium. Nev-
ertheless the joint payoff P1 + P2 is maximized at two boundary m-equilibria: (0, L) and
(L, 0). This suggests that under Cournot duopoly pricing it is profitable for firms to choose
an active monopolist and the other firm rest with no production. Switching the role of
monopolist between firms could become a strategy (in repeated game) for hidden transfer
of utility despite the payoff in game was assumed to be NTU. ♦
Example 10.[Puu duopoly; [BiChKoSz, Puu]] Let Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R),
S1 = S2 = [0, L], L > 1,
P1(x, y) = P2(y, x) =
(
L
x+ y
− 1
)
· x
for x, y ∈ [0, L] with convention that Pi(0, 0) = 0, i = 1, 2. Then NE(Γ) =
(
L
4
, L
4
)
.
By elementary (though a bit cumbersome) calculations
P ♭1(x, y) =
(
L
x+ y♯
− 1
)
· x
for (x, y) 6= (0, 0), where y♯ = max
(
y,
(
L
x+y
− 1
)
· x
)
. Hence P ♭1(x, y) = P
♭
2(y, x) =
min(y, P1(x, y)) for all x, y ∈ [0, L].
Puu duopoly enjoys a rich set of m-equilibria. Denote by L∗ ≈ 3.0796 the unique positive
root of the polynomial 1 + 4L+ 6L2 + 4L3 + L4 − L5 and put
E =
{ {(√L,√L · ( 4√L− 1)), (√L · ( 4√L− 1),√L)}, when L = L∗,
∅, otherwise.
Further, denote
N =
{ {(L/4, L/4)}, when L > 16,
∅, otherwise.
We have
ME(Γ) =
⋃
x∈[0,√L]
{x} × [0,
√
L− x] ∪ E ∪N.
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The extraordinary pair of m-equilibria at L = L∗ is an unexpected phenomenon. (It
seems to be a noneconomic artifact bond to the formal model). That Nash equilibria of
Γ need not be m-equilibria unless L is sufficiently large, is an effect of weakness of Nash
equilibrium: when taking into account the security of payoff, a treacherous partner can
switch precomitted (during cheap talk) strategy to a strategy indifferent for him but harm-
ful for his co-player. Formally, (L/4, L/4) is not a (weakly semi-) strict Nash equilibrium
for small L.
Finally observe that for L < 4 the m-equilibrium (
√
L/2,
√
L/2) Pareto dominates the
Nash equilibrium (L/4, L/4). One can stipulate that such m-equilibria might “explain”
cartels in a game theoretic way without a recourse to exterior (outside game) constructs. ♦
There is no doubt that the traveler’s dilemma was the driving force of our research. Note
that m-equilibria do not bring anything new to the (in)famous prisoner’s dilemma (PD).
This confirms that the traveler’s dilemma is not merely an extension of PD – it is something
qualitatively different. On the other hand simultaneous simplicity and nontriviality of PD
shows that having a good solution concept does not negate the reason to perform the play
at all: knowing consequences is not freeing us from making decisions.
6. Existence of m-equilibrium
We know from Theorem 3 that the class of games which possess at least one m-equilibrium
is quite large. Unfortunately we do not know whether m-equilibria exist under suitaby mild
assumptions in general. Nevertheless competitive games admit pure m-equilibria.
Theorem 4. If Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R) is the strictly competitive game with
compact metrizable strategy spaces Σi and continuous payoffs Pi, i = 1, 2, thenME(Γ) 6= ∅.
Namely, Wald solutions rest in m-equilibrium.
Proof. Observe that for σi, σ
′
i ∈ Σi, i = 1, 2
dH (Pi((σi,Σ−i)), Pi((σ′i,Σ−i)) ) ≤ sup
σ−i∈Σ−i
|Pi((σi, σ−i))− Pi((σ′i, σ−i))| ,
where dH stands for the Hausdorff distance in 2
R. Since Pi are uniformly continuous (as
continuous on the compactum), we know that Ψi : Σi → 2R, Ψi(σi) = Pi((σi,Σ−i)) for
σi ∈ Σi, are Hausdorff continuous with compact values. The Hausdorff nonexpansiveness
of min : 2R → R yields then the continuity of the map
Σi ∋ σi 7→ min
σ−i∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ−i)) = minΨi(σi).
This shows that we can define
σ∗i ∈ arg max
σi∈Σi
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ−i))
for i = 1, 2. So (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ∈ W (Γ) 6= ∅.
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Further by Proposition 3
max
σi∈Σi
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
Pi((σi, σ−i)) = max
σi∈Σi
P ♭i ((σi, σ−i))
= max
σi∈Σi
P ♭i ((σi, σ
∗
−i)) = P
♭
i ((σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i)) ≥ P ♭i ((σi, σ∗−i))
for any σi ∈ Σi, σ−i ∈ Σ−i. Therefore W (Γ) ⊂ NE(Γ♭) =ME(Γ). ⊠
Unfortunately the results established so far in the literature (cf. [Ba, Re, MoSc]) which
are concerned with the existence of equilibria in games with discontinuous payoff functions
do not seem to be applicable for the kind of problems considered here.
7. Mixed strategies and risk
The reason to calculate lower payoffs is establishing sure gains. Therefore one might
question the use of expected payoffs to evaluate gains. We single out this phenomenon in
the case of zero sum game.
Example 11.[extended matching pennies] Let S1 = S2 = {1, 2, 3},
G =
 [−1, 1] [1,−1] [0, 0][1,−1] [−1, 1] [0, 0]
[0, 0] [0, 0] [0, 0]
 .
Then NE(∆(G)) = {(δ3, δ3),
(
1
2
δ1 +
1
2
δ2,
1
2
δ1 +
1
2
δ2
)
,
(
1
2
δ1 +
1
2
δ2, δ3
)
,
(
δ3,
1
2
δ1 +
1
2
δ2
)}. Al-
though all equilibria yield the same expected payoff, they differ significantly from the point
of view of the risk. Namely the variance in payoff is nonzero unless both players use pure
strategies (standard property of random variables). This has consequence for risk averse
players usually not considered in the classic von Neumann’s minimax theory. ♦
Let S = {x1, x2, x3, x4, . . .} be the set of prizes with the associated utility function
U : S → R, such that U(x1) < U(x3) < U(x2). Risk neutral players calculate gain for the
lottery (S, pi), pi ∈ ∆(S), via the expected utility
EU(pi) =
∑
x∈S
pi(x) · U(x).
Hence they are indifferent in the choice between two lotteries ({x1, x2}, ρ) and {x3} as long
as EU(ρ) = U(x3).
However loss averse players would rather calculate the minimal gain
EminU(pi) = min
x∈suppπ
U(x)
for the lottery (S, pi). Then EminU(ρ) < U(x3) and {x3} is preferred over ({x1, x2}, ρ)
whenever x1 ∈ supp ρ. Take into account another lottery ({x1, x2}, ρ′) such that x1 ∈
supp ρ′. Then EminU(ρ′) = EminU(ρ), so ρ and ρ′ seem equally good. Still loss averse
players might evaluate which of the given two lotteries with the same minimal gain has
higher expected gain (as secondary criterion for preferences), EU(ρ) or EU(ρ′)?
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Concerning mixed strategies one should also be aware that the probability distribution
might be also interpreted deterministically as a set of weights describing “fair” allocation
of welfare/payoff induced by the choice of strategies. We discuss related questions in the
next Section.
8. Equilibrium selection
The concept of m-equilibrium takes loss aversion and correlated decision into serious
consideration. It demands communication and sure gains to be estimated. However it is not
correlated equilibrium of Aumann. It also accounts for losses on the more basic level than
the Harsanyi-Selten risk dominance selection criterion. Nevertheless m-equilibria (being
Nash equilibria of the game with flattened payoffs) suffer the same curse of nonuniqueness
(of payoff) as other notions of solution designed for non zero sum games.
To avoid complicated matters of the formal definitions of communication (pre-play) we
simply say that the players can communicate to establish the final decision in a game
Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R), provided there exists a “communication channel”
C : Σ1×Σ2 → ME(Γ), where C is a random variable distributed on the set of m-equilibria
according to probability α ∈ ∆[ME(Γ)]. Vector α will be interpreted further also as the
set of weights of welfare allocation among m-equilibria.
Although communication restores Pareto-efficient equilibrium selection in Example 1 and
the stag hunt game, we will face classical coordination dilemma posed by the battle of the
sexes game. In presence of equal power and credibility players, the coordination dilemma
is often resolved via fair allocation rule: “once for me, once for you”. We believe that
cooperative social choice among various equilibria is the appropriate answer to equilibrium
selection in both, one-shot and repeated games. Together with a social rule providing
the allocation vector α ∈ ∆[ME(Γ)], some stochastic tie-breaking rules are indispansable.
(During repeated play the variance of payoff outcomes arises as another problem. Alternate
choice of equilibria minimizes this variance).
Example 12.[Battle of the sexes] Let S1 = S2 = {1, 2},
G =
[
[3, 2] [0, 0]
[0, 0] [2, 3]
]
.
Then NE(G) =ME(G) = {(1, 1), (2, 2)}; α = 1
2
· δ(1,1) + 12 · δ(2,2). The only way to get rid
of the question “who’s equilibrium played first” is to apply randomization device according
to distribution given by α. This is an instance of Szaniawski’s probabilistically equal choice
principle ([Li]). In one-shot games stochastic mechanism for choosing the player who se-
lects preferred equilibrium to be played seems very reasonable also according to Laplace’s
criterion of insufficient reason. ♦
Once players receive the recommended equilibrium after pre-play phase, they form their
beliefs and strategic properties of m-equilibrium warrant the appropriate payoff levels re-
gardless of whether one of the players tries to exploit this information. Roughly speaking,
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to cut-off the inductive race to the bottom, it is enough that at least one player is fair.
This unavoidably leads to the problem of reputation.
9. Final comments
The following problems are very important for the discussion of the relevance of the
concept of m-equilibrium:
(1) Do (pure strategy) m-equilibria always exist under reasonable assumptions about
payoff functions?
(2) What other than traveler’s dilemma games admit “intuitively superior” m-equilibria
impossible within standardly interpreted Nash framework?
(3) How to cope with risk and welfare allocation? Does there exist any clear risk
dominance criterion? (Cf. [Hs]).
To prove a general existence theorem on m-equilibria definitely one cannot use continuity
of lower payoffs, but some assumptions about payoffs and strategy sets are indispensable.
Example 13. Let Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R), x, y ∈ Σ1 = Σ2 = [0,∞) and
L ≥ 2C > 0. We define P1(x, y) = P2(y, x) = Lxx+y − Cx , when x > 0 and P1(0, y) = 0
otherwise. We assume here (unlike[Puu, BiChKoSz]) that the total cost of production
decreases C/x ց 0 as the production of the firm increases x ր ∞. One can think
about this opportunity as the effect of scale (globalization). It turns out that under our
assumption of diminishing cost, the Puu duopoly behaves qualitatively in a similar fashion
to that observed in the competition of “giants”: each player has an incentive to grow
production for overtaking the market; in practice we expect the mirroring behavior of
firms, because it warrants maximal payoff share (according to TU value).
Interestingly P ♭1(x, y) = P
♭
2(y, x) = − Cx , which reflects an old truth that in business
one might bear the cost of production without any profit (“fall of a giant”). Consequently
ME(Γ) = {(0, 0)}. If Σ1 = Σ2 = (0,∞), then Γ has no m-equilibrium. A reasonable
workaround could be then to allow for an epsilon-m-equilibrium (produce as little as pos-
sible). ♦
A sky-rocketing competition in the above Example tells us that the dynamic view of
games is necessary when the game is played more than once.
We do not consider multiplayer games in this article because we believe that only good
understanding of two player games can give rise for reasonable extensions of static duel
games to the situation of multiple interacting agents. We are aware of specific “phase
transitions” and emergent effects when passing from the case of two players to the case of
multiple players.
The adaptation of the notion of m-equilibrium for multiplayer games should be done
carefully. Let Γ = (Σ1, . . . ,ΣN ;P1, . . ., PN : Σ1× . . .×ΣN → R) be a game with N players.
Since the player can only be sure of his own declaration and the communicated decisions of
others might be changed, the following definition of the lower payoff seems to be suitable
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in this sort of situation:
P ♭i (σ1, . . ., σN) = inf {Pi(ςJ )
: ∃J⊂{1,...,N} ∀j∈J Pj(ςJ) ≥ Pj(σ1, . . ., σN) }
for (σ1, . . ., σN), ς
J ∈ Σ1 × . . . × ΣN , where ςJi = σi when i 6∈ J , i.e., ςJ may differ from
(σ1, . . ., σN) for players i contributing to a virtual coalition J .
Some other ideas aiming to resolve the dominated strategies conundrum in traveler’s
dilemma were reported in [HlPs]. Another concept of solution suitable for traveler’s
dilemma (and accounting for the lack of communication unlike in the present article) is
Hofstadter’s superrationality which can be argued within bayesian framework, e.g., [Ms].
However our intention was to dispose off as much probability as possible.
The cryptic term “m-equilibrium” was thought off by the author in accordance with the
notion of meta-stable equilibrium appearing among others in chemistry and physics; that is
an extraordinary equilibrium (or higher state) possible only under very specific conditions.
Appendix: Isomorphism of games
We say that a function ϕ : R ⊃ Z → R is
• strictly inf-increasing, if for nonempty U1, U2 ⊂ Z
inf U1 < inf U2 ⇒ inf ϕ(U1) < inf ϕ(U2),
• inf-continuous, if for every nonempty U ⊂ Z such that inf U ∈ Z holds ϕ(inf U) =
inf ϕ(U),
• right continuous, if for every z0 ∈ Z and every (w.l.o.g. decreasing) sequence
zn ∈ Z, z0 ≤ zn → z0 holds ϕ(zn)→ ϕ(z0).
Proposition 8. Let ϕ : R ⊃ Z → R.
(1) If ϕ is strictly inf-increasing, then it is strictly increasing.
(2) If ϕ is (not necessarily strictly) increasing, then it is inf-continuous if and only if
it is right continuous.
(3) If Z = R and ϕ is strictly increasing inf-continuous, then it is strictly inf-increasing.
We warn that infima are taken in the whole R, not in the ordered subset Z ⊂ R. That
the notion of strictly inf-increasing function is essentially stronger than strictly increasing
function illustrates
Example 14. Let Z = {0} ∪ (1,∞) ⊂ R, ϕ : Z → R, ϕ(z) = max{z − 1, 0} for z ∈ Z.
Although ϕ is strictly increasing inf-continuous function it is not strictly inf-increasing. ♦
Proposition 9. Let Γ = (Σ1,Σ2;P1, P2 : Σ1×Σ2 → R) be a game and ϕi : Pi(Σ1×Σ2)→ R
be order-preserving maps, i = 1, 2, i.e.
∀u,v∈Pi(Σ1×Σ2) u < v⇒ϕi(u) < ϕi(v).
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Then the game Γ˜ = (Σ1,Σ2; P˜1, P˜2 : Σ1 × Σ2 → R) transformed from Γ via the formula
P˜i = ϕi ◦ Pi admits the same m-equilibria as the original game Γ; symbolically ME(Γ˜) =
ME(Γ).
Proof. Direct calculation shows that P˜i
♭
= ϕi◦P ♭i whence the conclusion follows. [Needed
ϕ(inf Z) = inf ϕ(Z)]. ⊠
An analysis of “equivalent” prisoner’s dilemmas shows that isomorphic games may have
nonequivalent risk structure. Therefore an appropriate concept of isomorphism of normal
form games is no less controversial than the choice of satisfactory definition of the solution
of a game or the equilibrium selection problem.
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